Competition enforcement agencies must be principled to effectively and credibly carry out their mandate, and the guiding principle is that a competitive market is superior to alternative economic systems. A competitive market is superior in terms of matching supply with demand, delivering needed products and services, putting downward pressure on prices paid by consumers, incentivizing efficiency, and sparking innovation. With that principle as a lodestar, an enforcement agency, even in times of crisis, will inevitably be reluctant to accept approaches to the production and distribution of goods and services that eliminate or restrain competition.

At the same time, competition enforcement agencies must inevitably be pragmatic. Enforcement pragmatism can take various forms. Pragmatism can be found in the matters that are prioritized for enforcement, how resources are allocated, in the cases chosen for litigation and in the remedies accepted that may allow avoidance of litigation. Pragmatism, however, generally should not trump principle in enforcement.

The extraordinary market conditions brought on by the COVID-19 outbreak are forcing competition enforcement agencies to consider whether and to what extent a new balance is needed between the pro-competitive principles that guide them and pragmatism that may allow critical goods and services to be produced and delivered as quickly as possible. It may even be the case that some competition enforcement agencies will be pressured by industry stakeholders and others to sacrifice principle altogether in favour of pragmatism, at least in the short term.

The situation now facing the world and the global economy is without any recent precedent and certainly without precedent during the current era in which free markets, and competition enforcement along with them, have been ascendant across the globe. Coming as it does when competition is still at a nascent stage in many places, the economic challenge presented by COVID-19 is a test of the commitment of jurisdictions to the underlying principle that guides their enforcement agencies.

Against this backdrop, the Hong Kong Competition Commission (Commission), a relatively new enforcement agency, recently issued guidance to the business community regarding its enforcement of the Hong Kong Competition Ordinance (Ordinance) related to the COVID-19 outbreak. In doing so, the Commission joined a number of enforcement agencies around the world that have issued similar guidance.

What is notable is that while enforcement agencies, including the Commission, have acknowledged the need for pragmatism in various forms---expedited assessments, comfort letters, and acceptance of short-term competitor collaborations---there generally has been no significant retreat from the principles that guide enforcement work in less uncertain times. This should not, perhaps, be surprising given the guiding principle, but even well-rooted principles can become casualties of crisis.

In its guidance, the Commission emphasized at the outset its commitment to the principles of competition, making clear that the Ordinance continues to apply and that the current crisis creates no room for the worst competitive abuses---cartels---that are universally regarded as having no pro-competitive justifications or efficiencies. Those abuses will be prioritized for rigorous enforcement. This, however, represents no change in the Commission's enforcement approach which has consistently ranked pursuit of cartels as its top enforcement priority.

The Commission's guidance goes on to remind the business community that a variety of business collaborations that could provide COVID-19-related solutions may be allowable under the Ordinance and potentially are subject to Commission blessing. These include joint buying, joint production, sales-related joint ventures, and exchanges of some types of information. Again, this represents no departure from the Commission's usual thinking or approach. The Commission's Guideline to the First Conduct Rule of the Ordinance highlights the potential permissibility of these types of collaborations even under normal circumstances.

Is the Commission's guidance thus intended to signal an unwillingness to make any pragmatic concessions to extraordinary circumstances? No. On the contrary, the Commission states its willingness to engage informally and on an expedited basis with businesses that are interested in pursuing short-term COVID-19-related collaborations. This is significant as enforcement agencies are often uncomfortable making quick assessments of collaborations, and the Ordinance provides only formal (and sometimes lengthy) application for decision and block exemption order processes for obtaining exemptions from the Ordinance for competitor agreements.

Although the Commission's guidance does not give any approval to potential arrangements in the abstract, it also does not expressly rule out any temporary arrangements between competitors intended to address COVID-19-related needs, except for hardcore cartels. If the Commission is consulted on any such COVID-19-related arrangements, it may well be left with difficult decisions about how to apply the elements of the Ordinance's economic efficiency exclusion, whether to exercise its discretion to permit collaborations for a finite time that it would seek to prohibit or modify if of open-ended duration, and whether it will provide express comfort or statements of enforcement intention for worthy collaborations if required by the parties to move forward. All of these represent ways in which the Commission may consider exercising greater pragmatism in enforcement decisions related to COVID-19 collaborations without sacrificing the principle that a competitive market is best suited to provide solutions to our current needs.
